The leakage and livelihood impacts of PES contracts: A targeting experiment in Malawi

摘要

Most evaluations of payments for environmental services programs focus on immediate environmental impacts, and do not measure the effects on socioeconomic outcomes or on other land use activities (leakage). Efficient allocation of land use contracts, through auctions for example, may help mitigate concerns about adverse livelihood or leakage effects. This study reports on a field experiment that varied the allocation of afforestation contracts to smallholder farmers in Malawi. Households were randomly assigned to participate in an auction or in a lottery for the contracts, which provided three years of payment based on tree survival outcomes. Households that did not receive a contract as a result of the lottery form a pure comparison group. The results show evidence for within-farm leakage for households that received a contract at random, in the form of additional land clearing. Randomly contracted households are also more likely to report household labor shortages. These effects are mitigated to some degree when contracts are assigned through an auction. Together, the results point to leakage and livelihood impacts from payments for environmental services that are often overlooked in standard evaluations, but which may be reduced through improvements in contract targeting. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.