The Political Economy of Trade Protection: The Determinants and Welfare Impact of the 2002 US Emergency Steel Safeguard Measures

摘要

The US Emergency Safeguard Measures on steel highlights several important issues relating to the political economy of international trade policy. The Safeguards were the result of interaction between several critical factors. The deteriorating international competitive position of parts of the US steel industry was compounded by increasing import penetration during the 1990s, giving rise to a series of protective trade measures, and the subsequent economic downturn in 2000. Intense pressure for further protection against steel imports arose from an effective lobby comprising steel firms, the industry federation, unions and political representatives in key marginal 'rust-belt' states. The steel Safeguards probably achieved their primary political objective of Republican gains in the key marginal states in the November 2002 mid-term elections and may also have contributed to determining the 2004 Presidential election. In recent decades, the United States has exhibited a predisposition towards trade intervention in steel. During the second Clinton administration, this was tempered by the proviso that such intervention was WTO-compatible. The Bush administration has had no such proviso but its greater protectionist sentiments, partly in the interest of short-term domestic political expediency, have nevertheless ultimately been subject to the same compatibility criterion.