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The Promise of Performance Pay? Reasons for Caution in Policy Prescriptions in the Core Civil Service

机译:绩效工资的承诺?在核心公务员制度中谨慎对待政策规定的原因

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There is a vast body of literature on performance-related pay (PRP), with strongly held views from opponents and proponents. This study reviews this literature, disaggregating the available evidence by the different public sector contexts, particularly the different types of public sector jobs, the quality of the empirical study, and the economic context (developing country or OECD settings), with the aim of distilling useful lessons for policymakers in developing countries. The overall findings of the review are generally positive across these contextual categories. In particular, the findings from high quality studies, based on a simple scoring method for internal and external validity, of PRP in public sector-equivalent jobs show that explicit performance standards linked to some form of bonus pay can improve the desired service outcomes, at times dramatically. This evidence primarily concerns "craft" jobs, such as teaching, health care, and revenue administration, apparently negating (at least in the short term) the behavioral economics concern about the crowding out of intrinsic incentives. The available evidence suggests that if policymakers are sensitive to design and vigilant about the risks of gaming, then PRP may result in performance improvements in these jobs in developing countries. However, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from the review about the effect of PRP in core civil service jobs for three reasons. First, there are very few studies of PRP in these organizational contexts. The work of senior administrators in the civil service is very different from that of many private sector jobs and is characterized by task complexity and the difficulty of measuring outcomes. Second, although some studies have shown that PRP can work in even the most dysfunctional bureaucracies in developing countries, there are few cases illustrating its effectiveness or otherwise outside OECD settings. Finally, few studies follow PRP effects over time, providing little information on long-term effects and adjustments in staff behavior. We conclude that more empirical research is needed to examine the effects of PRP in the core civil service in developing countries.
机译:关于绩效工资(PRP)的文献很多,反对者和拥护者都持强烈观点。这项研究回顾了这些文献,从不同的公共部门环境中,特别是不同类型的公共部门工作,实证研究的质量和经济环境(发展中国家或经合组织国家)的角度,对现有证据进行了分类,目的是提炼出来。给发展中国家决策者的有益经验。审查的总体结果在这些上下文类别中通常是积极的。特别是,基于对内部和外部有效性进行简单评分的高质量研究的结果,基于公共部门等效工作的PRP,表明明确的绩效标准与某种形式的奖金挂钩,可以改善期望的服务成果。倍增。该证据主要涉及“手工艺品”工作,例如教学,医疗保健和税收管理,显然(至少在短期内)否定了关于排挤内在动机的行为经济学问题。现有证据表明,如果决策者对设计敏感并且对博彩风险保持警惕,那么PRP可能会改善发展中国家这些工作的绩效。但是,由于三个原因,很难从审查中得出关于PRP在核心公务员职位中作用的坚定结论。首先,在这些组织环境中对PRP的研究很少。公务员中高级管理人员的工作与许多私营部门的工作有很大不同,其特点是任务复杂且难以衡量结果。其次,尽管一些研究表明,PRP甚至可以在发展中国家功能最失调的官僚机构中发挥作用,但很少有案例可以证明PRP的有效性或在OECD范围之外的有效性。最后,很少有研究关注PRP随时间变化的影响,很少提供有关长期影响和员工行为调整的信息。我们得出结论,需要进行更多的实证研究,以检验PRP在发展中国家核心公务员制度中的作用。

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