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Do Race and Fairness Matter in Generosity? Evidence from a Nationally Representative Charity Experiment

机译:种族和公平是否重要?全国代表性慈善实验的证据

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摘要

We present a dictator game experiment where the recipients are local charities that serve the poor. Donors consist of approximately 1000 participants from a nationally representative respondent panel that is maintained by a private survey research firm, Knowledge Networks. We randomly manipulate the perceived race and worthiness of the charity recipients by showing respondents an audiovisual presentation about the recipients. The experiment yields three main findings. First, we find significant racial bias in perceptions of worthiness: respondents rate recipients of their own racial group as more worthy. Second, respondents give significantly more when the recipients are described as more worthy. These findings may lead one to expect that respondents would also give more generously when shown pictures of recipients belonging to their own racial group. However, our third result shows that this is not the case; despite our successfully manipulating perceptions of race, giving does not respond significantly to recipient race. Thus, while our respondents do seem to rate ingroup members as more worthy, they appear to overcome this bias when it comes to giving.
机译:我们提出了一个独裁者游戏实验,其中的接受者是为穷人服务的当地慈善机构。捐赠者由来自全国的具有代表性的受访者小组的大约1000名参与者组成,该小组由一家私人调查研究公司Knowledge Networks维护。我们通过向受访者展示有关接收者的视听演示,来随机操纵慈善接收者的感知种族和价值。该实验得出三个主要发现。首先,我们发现在对价值感的看法上存在明显的种族偏见:受访者将自己种族群体的接受者评为更有价值。其次,当称接收者更有价值时,受访者会付出更多。这些发现可能使人们期望,当显示出属于自己种族群体的接受者的照片时,受访者也会慷慨解囊。但是,我们的第三个结果表明情况并非如此。尽管我们成功地操纵了对种族的看法,但捐赠并未对接受者的种族做出重大反应。因此,虽然我们的受访者似乎确实认为小组成员更有价值,但他们似乎在克服捐赠方面的偏见。

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  • 来源
    《Working Paper Series》 |2009年第15064期|A11-45|共46页
  • 作者单位

    Department of Social and Decision Sciences Carnegie Mellon University 500 Forbes Avenue, BP 208 Pittsburgh, PA 15213;

    Kennedy School of Government, Mailbox 25 Harvard University 79 John F. Kennedy Street Cambridge, MA 02138;

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