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HOW QUANTITATIVE EASING WORKS: EVIDENCE ON THE REFINANCING CHANNEL

机译:量化轻松工作的方式:对重新分配渠道的证明

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Despite massive large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) by central banks around the world since the global financial crisis, there is a lack of empirical evidence on whether and how these programs affect the real economy. Using rich borrower-linked mortgage-market data, we document that there is a "flypaper effect" of LSAPs, where the transmission of unconventional monetary policy to interest rates and (more importantly) origination volumes depends crucially on the assets purchased and degree of segmentation in the market. For example, QE1, which involved significant purchases of GSE-guaranteed mortgages, increased GSE-eligible mortgage originations significantly more than the origination of GSE-ineligible mortgages. In contrast, QE2's focus on purchasing Treasuries did not have such differential effects. We find that the Fed's purchase of MBS (rather than exclusively Treasuries) during QE1 resulted in an additional $600 billion of refinancing, substantially reduced interest payments for refinancing households, led to a boom in equity extraction, and increased refinancing mortgagors' consumption by an additional $76 billion. This de facto allocation of credit across mortgage market segments, combined with sharp bunching around GSE eligibility cutoffs, establishes an important complementarity between monetary policy and macroprudential housing policy. Our counterfactual simulations estimate that relaxing GSE eligibility requirements would have significantly increased refinancing activity in response to QE1, including a 20% increase in equity extraction by households. Overall, our results imply that central banks could most effectively provide unconventional monetary stimulus by supporting the origination of debt that would not be originated otherwise.
机译:自全球金融危机以来,尽管世界各国中央银行进行了大规模的大规模资产购买(LSAP),但仍缺乏关于这些计划是否以及如何影响实体经济的经验证据。使用与借款人相关的丰富抵押贷款市场数据,我们记录了LSAP的“纸面效应”,其中非常规货币政策向利率和(更重要的是)原始交易量的传导在很大程度上取决于所购买的资产和细分程度在市场上。例如,涉及大量购买GSE担保抵押贷款的QE1,使符合GSE资格的抵押贷款来源的增加明显大于不符合GSE资格的抵押贷款的来源。相比之下,QE2对购买国债的关注没有这种差异性影响。我们发现,美联储在QE1期间购买MBS(而不是仅购买美国国债)导致了额外的6,000亿美元再融资,为再融资家庭带来的利息支出大大减少,导致了股权提取的繁荣,并且再融资抵押人的消费增加了760亿美元。这种按揭贷款市场领域的事实上的信贷分配,加上围绕GSE资格门槛的急剧集聚,在货币政策与宏观审慎住房政策之间建立了重要的互补性。我们的反事实模拟估计,放宽GSE资格要求将显着增加针对QE1的再融资活动,包括增加20%的家庭股权提取。总体而言,我们的结果暗示,中央银行可以通过支持债务本来可以最有效地提供非常规的货币刺激,否则这些债务就不会产生。

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  • 来源
    《Working Paper Series》 |2016年第22638期|2-75A1-A2|共76页
  • 作者单位

    Harvard Business School Baker Library 265 Soldiers Field Boston, MA 02163 and NBER;

    Haas School of Business University of California, Berkeley 545 Student Services Building #1900 Berkeley, CA 94720 and NBER;

    Haas School of Business University of California, Berkeley 545 Student Services Building #1900 Berkeley, CA 94720;

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