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LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE LCS

机译:从LCS中学到的经验教训

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摘要

The Navy's littoral combat ship (LCS) has undergone a stream of criticism since its inception in 2001. Instead of slowly diminishing, the criticisms-from Congress, the Government Accountability Office, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and even within the Navy-continued and grew more serious. In a February 2014 memo, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel confirmed what had been leaked in January: Instead of a planned fleet of 52 LCSs, "no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships will go forward." In the memo, he directed the Navy to submit proposals for alternative small surface combatants "generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate."
机译:自2001年成立以来,海军的沿海战斗舰(LCS)遭到了批评。来自国会,政府问责办公室,国防部长办公室(OSD)乃至内部的批评并没有逐渐减少。海军继续前进,并变得更加严肃。国防部长查克·黑格尔(Chuck Hagel)在2014年2月的备忘录中证实了1月份泄漏的情况:除了计划中的52艘LCS舰队外,“将不会进行超过32艘舰船的新合同谈判。”在备忘录中,他指示海军“通常与护卫舰的能力保持一致”,为其他小型水面战斗机提出建议。

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