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Cyber Secrecy Undermines Deterrence

机译:网络保密破坏威慑力

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Cyber operators can learn a succinct lesson on effective deterrence from Stanley Kubrick's 1964 Cold War-era satire about nuclear war, Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. In Kubrick's film, U.S. forces are committed to a first-strike nuclear attack against a seemingly vulnerable Soviet Union. As the plot thickens, Dr. Strangelove learns that the Soviet Union has in fact developed a doomsday device, or second-strike capability, which would execute a catastrophic nuclear retaliation in the event of a first strike against the Soviets. Strangelove points out that the doomsday device only would have been an effective deterrent if everyone knew about it. This principle of deterrence-the knowledge of a certain, consequential response-is what keeps hands off the red button. Today, attacks across the cyber realm go undeterred because our cyber forces have failed to specify real and tangible consequences for such attacks against the United States.
机译:网络运营商可以从斯坦利·库布里克(Stanley Kubrick)1964年的冷战时期对核战争的讽刺中,对斯坦福·库弗里克(Strangelove)博士或:《我如何学会制止忧虑和热爱炸弹》的内容进行有效威慑的简要教训。在库布里克的电影中,美国部队致力于对看似脆弱的苏联进行第一次打击。随着情节的加剧,Strangelove博士获悉,苏联实际上已经开发出了世界末日装置,即第二次打击能力,如果对苏联发动第一次打击,它将实施灾难性的核报复行动。 Strangelove指出,如果每个人都知道这一世界末日的装置,它只会起到有效的威慑作用。这种威慑原则-一定的,相应的响应知识-可以使您远离红色按钮。如今,整个网络领域的攻击已变得不容置疑,因为我们的网络力量未能明确指出此类针对美国的攻击所产生的实际和实际后果。

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