首页> 外文期刊>The Submarine Review >SEA MINES, THE SUBMARINE'S ADVERSARY AND WEAPON: 1775 TO 1918 PART Ⅱ: 20TH CENTURY
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SEA MINES, THE SUBMARINE'S ADVERSARY AND WEAPON: 1775 TO 1918 PART Ⅱ: 20TH CENTURY

机译:海底世界,潜艇的敌人和武器:1775年至1918年第二部分:20世纪

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At the time of the Armistice in November of 1918, the mine was a comparatively inexpensive weapon with a proven success in naval warfare. The mine was responsible for the highest attrition of warships, compared with that of all other surface weapons combined in that war. In World War Ⅰ, more than 300,000 mines sank or damaged more than 950 Allied and Central Power, warships, merchantmen, and submarines. Allies lost 586 merchant ships and 87 warships not including 152 small patrol boats and minesweepers. The Central Powers' losses to mines included 129 warships, excluding an unknown number of merchant ships and submarines. Once again, the total ship damage in WWI from mines was far greater than that by gunfire and torpedoes. The effectiveness of the submarine, the torpedo, and the mine almost from the first days of World War Ⅰ was not anticipated. Countering each became an all-consuming task for both sides for the entire war. In the almost 90 years since the Armistice, means to counter the submarine and the two weapons continues to confound those involved. A kind of consensus regarding the lack of preparation or anticipation of the submarine's guerre de course, the mine, and torpedo in some instances was based on the lack of fiscal resources in peacetime to meet the requirements of the military. In the case of Great Britain, attention to preparing for offensive high seas battleship or dreadnought encounter seems to have precluded adequate support for alternative weapons like the mine and torpedo. Throughout the war, the inexpensive mine inhibited battleship maneuvers or even putting to sea in some instances. Historical evidence shows that sea mines, depth charges and submarines at some point in their introduction received slow acceptance as they were perceived as being a weapon for nations with small or inferior navies. In the 19th century, acceptance of steam versus sail in the United States Navy was not unanimous. During most of the first half of the 20th century, the concentration on capital-ship construction with the attendant cost and crew size was often steep competition for small ship needs and attention to new naval technologies. In retrospect, small-specialized ships for convoys, mining and countermining were frequently lacking. However, the role of mines in World WarⅡ, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq Wars have each brought careful attention to sea mines and their defensive and offensive roles as the weapons that wait.
机译:在1918年11月停战协定时期,该地雷是一种相对廉价的武器,在海军战争中取得了成功。与该次战争中所有其他地面武器相比,该地雷是造成军舰最大损耗的原因。第一次世界大战中,超过30万枚地雷沉没或损坏了950多个盟军和中央力量,军舰,商船和潜艇。盟军损失了586艘商船和87艘军舰,其中不包括152艘小型巡逻艇和扫雷舰。中央大国对地雷的损失包括129艘军舰,不包括数量不明的商船和潜艇。再次,第一次世界大战中地雷对舰船造成的总伤害远远大于枪击和鱼雷造成的伤害。几乎从第一次世界大战开始就没想到潜水艇,鱼雷和地雷的有效性。在整个战争中,对付双方都是双方的一项艰巨任务。自停战协定以来的将近90年中,对抗潜艇的手段和这两件武器继续使所涉人员感到困惑。关于在某些情况下缺乏对潜艇的游击路线,地雷和鱼雷的准备或预期的一种共识是基于和平时期缺乏财政资源来满足军方的需求。以英国为例,对准备进攻性公海战舰或无畏遭遇的关注似乎阻止了对诸如地雷和鱼雷之类的替代武器的充分支持。在整个战争中,廉价的地雷在某些情况下会抑制战列舰的机动甚至出海。历史证据表明,在引入地雷,深水炸弹和潜艇的某些时候,它们被人们缓慢接受,因为它们被认为是海军规模较小或劣等国家的武器。在19世纪,美国海军对蒸汽与航行的接受并非一致。在20世纪上半叶的大部分时间里,资本船的建设以及随之而来的成本和船员规模通常集中在对小型船的需求和对新海军技术的关注上。回顾过去,经常缺少用于护航,采矿和扫雷的小型专业船。但是,在第二次世界大战,朝鲜战争,越南战争和伊拉克战争中,地雷的作用都引起了对地雷及其作为等待武器的防御和进攻作用的关注。

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