ABSOLUTE IDENTITY/UNITY

摘要

[...] this terminological coinage is questionable because "absolute" means "without relation," and Leibniz's Law rests on the relation between numerical and qualitative identity. [...] in what follows the notion of "absolute identity" shall be reserved for an even ontologically stronger understanding; (5) finally there is the strong ontologica! notion, which can be found in the monism of Parmenides and Spinoza, of an all-identity, an identity of everything with everything in the form of one and only entity or substance.6 However, the last meaning of all-identity is not the strongest ontologically possible understanding of identity and therefore not the most crucial one for our ontological understanding of the world because all-identity can be differentiated internally, as Spinoza assumed in respect to attributes and modi.7 Parmenides allowed internal relations too,8 and so did Bradley.9 The ontologically strongest possible form of identity would be one of an all-identity (as in 5) without any internal differentiation.