CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW POLICY: SOME REFLECTIONS

摘要

This article has presented an overview of the different elements and variables involved in transboundary water issues between upstream China and its downstream counterparts. We asserted that the contemporary approach to Chinese transboundary water policy as demonstrated by its internal water governance stems from its unique mentality with regard to governance. Both international and intra-provincial water disputes were referenced in our case studies to demonstrate their approach as such. On a domestic level, every province in China views its respective sections of transboundary rivers within its own territory as its own property and hesitates to share it with other provinces. The Chinese Water Law identifies water resources as a state-owned enterprise. However, the central government does not yet -equitably distribute water to the provinces. Despite rapid economic reforms, Chinese notions of ownership and utilisation of water resources on both a domestic and an international level appear so far to be unchanged from China's historical views. On the one hand, China insists that its sovereignty rights are paramount to the obligations imposed by the United Nations Convention on Non-navigational Uses of International Rivers, and continues to build dams under the premise of this right. On the other hand, there has been internal Chinese discussion that urges for reforms, for instance to view water as a tradable good to be distributed in a market-based model. Such reforms have the potential to change how China allocates its water resources internally, as well as alter its mindset and pave the way for better transboundary water cooperation. China's upstream position empowers it to reject the United Nations Convention on Non-navigational Uses of International Rivers, the fairness of which is controversial as it protects the interests of the downstream states over those of the upstream countries. Engaging China in more bilateral or multilateral water agreements may be a more feasible alternative to waiting for the water hegemon to collaborate with the United Nations Convention on Non-navigational Uses of International Rivers, which would inevitably be to China's disadvantage. LeMarquand's contextual framework is helpful for evaluating this possibility. Although there are conflicting interests involved in transboundary water issues between upstream and downstream states, upstream states may still agree to concessions for non-economic reasons. Apart from economic outputs, China needs to cultivate friendly diplomatic relationships and strategic partnerships further and present a responsible and diplomatic international image to better promote itself as a reliable leader in the emergent world order.