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Report of the New York City Bar Association Task Force on the Lawyer's Role in Corporate Governance—November 2006 [Excerpted for Publication in The Business Lawyer]

机译:纽约市律师协会律师工作组在公司治理中的作用的报告,2006年11月[摘录于《商业律师》。

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The subject of the lawyer's role in corporate governance is a complex matter. The "right answers" are not susceptible to empirical proof. No one can speak with confidence, at any level of generality, concerning the involvement (or non-involvement) of lawyers with the recent prominent corporate frauds. The shroud surrounding attorney-client dealings, a product of the attorney-client privilege and confidentiality obscures such facts with respect to many alleged frauds. Nor is it possible to muster empirical proof to demonstrate that preserving confidentiality is essential to the optimal functioning of the attorney-client relationship. Reiving as we must on our own experience, the observations of practitioners, regulators and commentators we respect, and common sense, we do believe that any "reform" undermining the confidential nature of a lawyer's relationship with his or her client would represent an overreaction to the recent scandals and a cure worse than the disease. Nonetheless, there ought to be a new determination by the corporate bar to play its proper role as confidential advisor counseling compliance with the law—and conduct exceeding its minimum requirements—in a clear and forthright manner. We believe our recommendations of best practices should be helpful in facilitating the effective performance of this role. Clear advice, including escalating a problem up the corporate hierarchy when necessary, should obviate almost all serious potential violations of law coming to a lawyer's attention. No lawyer should knowingly acquiesce in client conduct clearly violating the securities laws, whether or not the lawyer's services are directly implicated in the wrongdoing. Reporting up often will be obligatory in such an instance under the SEC lawyer conduct rules and the ABAs Model Rules. Those rules also permit withdrawal and, depending on the circumstances, may also permit reporting out if reporting up fails to end the wrongdoing. A lawyer should not shrink from those actions, if confronted with the rare circumstances that warrant them.
机译:律师在公司治理中的角色是一个复杂的问题。 “正确答案”不受经验证明的影响。在任何笼统的水平上,没有人能充满信心地谈论律师参与(或不参与)最近发生的著名公司欺诈案。律师-委托人交易的笼罩,律师-委托人特权和保密性的产物掩盖了关于许多所谓欺诈的事实。也不可能收集经验证据来证明保持保密对律师-委托人关系的最佳运作必不可少。根据我们的经验,我们必须尊重从业人员,监管者和评论员的意见,并尊重常识,我们确实认为,任何破坏律师与客户关系的机密性质的“改革”都将对最近的丑闻和治愈方法都比这种疾病更糟。但是,公司律师事务所应该重新确定其职责,以明确,直率的方式发挥其作为机密顾问的适当作用,为遵守法律以及行为超出法律的最低要求提供咨询。我们认为,我们关于最佳做法的建议应有助于促进这一角色的有效履行。明确的建议,包括在必要时将问题升级为公司层次结构,应避免引起律师注意的几乎所有严重的潜在违法行为。无论律师的服务是否直接与不当行为有关,任何律师都不得明知默认客户行为明显违反证券法。在这种情况下,根据SEC律师行为规则和ABAs规则,通常必须举报。这些规则还允许撤回,并且根据情况,如果举报未能结束不当行为,也可能允许举报。如果遇到需要采取行动的罕见情况,律师不应屈服于这些行动。

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    《The Business Lawyer》 |2007年第2期|p.427-513|共87页
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  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 政治、法律;
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  • 入库时间 2022-08-18 02:37:58

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