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A Percolation Model Of Eco-innovation Diffusion: The Relationship Between Diffusion, Learning Economies And Subsidies

机译:生态创新扩散的渗流模型:扩散,学习经济与补贴之间的关系

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摘要

An obstacle to the widespread adoption of environmentally friendly energy technologies such as stationary and mobile fuel cells is their high upfront costs. While much lower prices seem to be attainable in the future due to learning curve cost reductions that increase rapidly with the scale of diffusion of the technology, there is a chicken and egg problem, even when some consumers may be willing to pay more for green technologies. Drawing on recent percolation models of diffusion, we develop a network model of new technology diffusion that combines contagion among consumers with heterogeneity of agent characteristics. Agents adopt when the price falls below their random reservation price drawn from a lognormal distribution, but only when one of their neighbors has already adopted. Combining with a learning curve for the price as a function of the cumulative number of adopters, this may lead to delayed adoption for a certain range of initial conditions. Using agent-based simulations we explore when a limited subsidy policy can trigger diffusion that would otherwise not happen. The introduction of a subsidy policy seems to be highly effective for a given high initial price level only for learning economies in a certain range. Outside this range, the diffusion of a new technology either never takes off despite the subsidies, or the subsidies are unnecessary. Perhaps not coincidentally, this range seems to correspond to the values observed for many successful innovations.
机译:诸如固定式和移动式燃料电池之类的环保能源技术被广泛采用的障碍是其高昂的前期成本。虽然由于学习曲线成本的降低随着技术的扩散规模而迅速增加,未来似乎可以实现更低的价格,但是即使某些消费者可能愿意为绿色技术支付更高的费用,仍然存在鸡与蛋的问题。 。利用最近的扩散渗透模型,我们开发了一种新技术扩散的网络模型,该模型将消费者之间的传染与代理商特征的异质性相结合。当价格低于对数正态分布得出的随机保留价格时,代理就会采用,但前提是其邻居之一已经采用。结合价格的学习曲线作为采用者累计数量的函数,这可能会导致在一定范围的初始条件下延迟采用。使用基于代理的模拟,我们探索了有限的补贴政策何时会触发本来不会发生的扩散。对于给定的高初始价格水平,仅对于一定范围内的学习型经济体,引入补贴政策似乎是非常有效的。超出此范围,尽管有补贴,但新技术的传播要么从未实现,要么是不必要的补贴。也许并非巧合,该范围似乎与许多成功的创新所观察到的值相对应。

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