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THE STRATEGIC IMPETUS FOR SOCIAL NETWORK TIES: RECONSTITUTING BROKEN CEO FRIENDSHIP TIES

机译:社交网络纽带的战略动力:重建残破的CEO友谊纽带

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Research on organization-environment relations has focused primarily on formal linkages between organizations such as board interlock ties as a strategy for managing resource dependence. This study examines whether top corporate executives may maintain more informal ties to executives of other firms in order to manage uncertainty arising from resource dependence. Our point of departure is prior research on boards of directors that has examined whether so-called 'broken board ties' (i.e., ties that are disrupted due to executive turnover) tend to be reconstituted, and whether resource dependence explains the likelihood of reconstitution. These studies have generally provided little evidence that corporate board ties are used to manage resource dependence. We draw from theory and research on social embeddedness and friendship to suggest that, as a strategy for managing dependence, the maintenance of friendship ties between top executives provides benefits that are comparable to the supposed benefits of board cooptation, while imposing fewer constraints on the organization. Our theory leads to the contention that, despite limited prior evidence that resource dependence determines the formation of formal board ties, corporate leaders may nevertheless reconstitute informal (i.e., friendship) ties to leaders of other firms that have the power to constrain their firms' access to needed resources when those ties have been disrupted (e.g., due to turnover of the CEO's friend). We test our hypotheses with a unique dataset that includes survey data from U.S. corporate leaders collected at two points in time, thus permitting an assessment of whether top executives reconstitute broken social ties to leaders of other firms, and whether various sources of resource dependence predict the likelihood of reconstitution. We discuss implications for strategic perspectives on inter-organizational relations and the sociological literature on embeddedness.
机译:组织与环境关系的研究主要集中于组织之间的正式联系,例如董事会互锁关系,作为管理资源依赖的策略。这项研究研究了高层管理人员是否可以与其他公司的管理人员保持更多的非正式联系,以便管理由于资源依赖而引起的不确定性。我们的出发点是对董事会的先前研究,该研究检查了是否倾向于重新构建所谓的``破碎的董事会联系''(即因高管人员流动而中断的联系)以及资源依赖是否可以解释重组的可能性。这些研究通常几乎没有提供证据证明公司董事会关系用于管理资源依赖。我们从关于社会包容性和友谊的理论和研究中得出的建议表明,作为一种管理依赖性的策略,高层管理人员之间的友谊关系的维持所产生的收益可与董事会合作的假定收益相媲美,同时对组织施加的约束更少。我们的理论导致这样的争论:尽管先前证据有限,资源依赖关系决定了正式的董事会联系的形成,但是公司领导者仍可能与其他有权限制其公司访问权限的公司的领导者重新建立非正式(即友谊)联系。当这些关系中断时(例如,由于CEO的朋友的营业额),需要的资源。我们用一个独特的数据集来检验我们的假设,该数据集包括在两个时间点收集的来自美国企业领导者的调查数据,从而可以评估高管人员是否与其他公司的领导者重新建立了破裂的社会联系,以及各种资源依赖来源是否预测了重组的可能性。我们讨论了对组织间关系的战略观点以及对嵌入性的社会学文献的启示。

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