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Detection of Homophilic Communities and Coordination of Interacting Meta-Agents: A Game-Theoretic Viewpoint

机译:嗜好社区的检测和互动的Meta-Agent的协调:一个博弈论的观点

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This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of homophilic behavior namely, of homophilic communities and the distributed of meta-agents, which interact with the detected homophilic communities. First, the theory of revealed preferences from microeconomics is used to construct a nonparametric decision test for homophilic behavior using only the time series of external influences and associated agents’ responses. These tests rely on rationalizing the dataset of agents’ actions as the play from the Nash equilibrium of a concave potential game. A stochastic gradient algorithm is given to optimize the external influence signal in real time to minimize the Type-II error probabilities of the detection test subject to specified Type-I error probability. Using the decision test, methods are provided to detect for homophilic communities. Subsequently, a nonparametric algorithm is presented that uses the constructed potential function for the potential game to predict the preferences of the detected homophilic communities. Second, we present a non-cooperative game model for interaction of meta-agents that interact with the communities and propose an algorithm that prescribes meta-agents how to take actions based on the preference of the communities and past interaction information with other meta-agents. The proposed algorithm has two timescales: the timescale is the nonparametric preference learning presented in the first part, and the timescale is a regret-matching stochastic approximation algorithm. It is shown that, if all meta-agents follow the proposed algorithm, their collective behavior is attracted to the correlated equilibria set of the game. This means that meta-agents can co-ordinate their strategies in a distributed fashion as if there exists a centralized coordinating device that they all trust to follow. We provide a real-world examp- e using the energy market, and a numerical example to detect malicious agents in an online social network.
机译:本文研究了同源行为的两个重要信号处理方面,即同源社区和与检测到的同源社区相互作用的元代理的分布。首先,从微观经济学中揭示偏好的理论被用于仅使用外部影响和相关行为者的时间序列来构建针对同性恋行为的非参数决策测试。这些测试依赖于合理化代理商行为的数据集,因为它来自凹潜在游戏的纳什均衡。给出了一种随机梯度算法来实时优化外部影响信号,以使检测测试在指定的I型错误概率下的II型错误概率最小。使用决策测试,提供了检测同质社区的方法。随后,提出了一种非参数算法,该算法使用针对潜在博弈构造的潜在函数来预测检测到的同族社区的偏好。其次,我们提出了一种与社区互动的元代理互动的非合作博弈模型,并提出了一种算法,该算法规定元代理如何基于社区的偏好以及过去与其他元代理的交互信息采取行动。所提出的算法具有两个时间尺度:时间尺度是第一部分提出的非参数偏好学习,时间尺度是后悔匹配的随机逼近算法。结果表明,如果所有元智能体都遵循所提出的算法,那么它们的集体行为就会被吸引到博弈的相关均衡集上。这意味着元代理可以以分布式方式协调其策略,就好像存在一个他们都信任遵循的集中式协调设备一样。我们提供了一个使用能源市场的真实案例,并提供了一个数字示例来检测在线社交网络中的恶意代理。

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