Competition For Versus In the Market of Long-Distance Passenger Rail Services

摘要

This paper is aimed at evaluating the net gains and trade-offs at stakernin implementing the competition of the rail mode in the long distance passengerrnmarket either by means of franchise or by an open access mechanism. Wernsimulate the outcomes of competition in and for the market using a differentiatedproductsrnoligopoly model allowing for inter- and intra-modal competition in arnlong distance passenger market. Specifically we first calibrate the model usingrndata describing high speed lines in France and show that the incumbent railwayrnoperator’s strategy does not simply boil down to a short-term profit maximizationrn(e.g. because of existing regulation or limit-pricing strategy). This yieldsrntwo important results when simulating competition. First, whether it is for or inrnthe market, the opening to competition does not guarantee a decrease in pricesrnin favor of passengers. Second, the effects of opening up to competition for thernmarket are relatively predictable and potentially positive, while those of openingrnup to competition in the market remain very uncertain.