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The Borda rule and the pairwise-majority-loser revisited

机译:Borda规则和重新审视的成对大多数失败者

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摘要

Jean-Charles de Borda introduced the Borda rule with the motivation of avoiding the so-called pairwise-majority-loser. We revisit this topic by examining the uniqueness of the Borda rule as a scoring rule that is consistent with the pairwise-majority-loser criterion. We first show that this uniqueness does not hold for any fixed population. In fact, when there are three alternatives and six voters, all scoring rules are consistent with the pairwise-majority-loser criterion. We then show that for each non-Borda scoring rule, there exists a population n such that the rule is not consistent with this criterion for all populations of size larger than n.
机译:Jean-Charles de Borda推出了波尔巴规则,避免了避免所谓的成对大多数失败者。我们通过检查BORDA规则的独特性作为与成对大多数失败者标准一致的评分规则来重新审视本主题。我们首先表明这种唯一性并没有持有任何固定人口。事实上,当有三个替代品和六名选民时,所有评分规则都与成对大多数失败者标准一致。然后,我们表明,对于每个非BORDA评分规则,存在一个人口n,使得规则与大小大于n大小的所有群体的标准不一致。

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