Tax enforcement policies, tax evasion and time allocation

摘要

Several studies examine the effect of tax rates on households' labor supply decisions in attempts to account for observed differences in work hours across countries. Interestingly, these studies fail to consider a fundamental action associated with taxation: tax evasion. This paper introduces, into a general equilibrium model of household labor supply, the possibility that households can evade labor income taxes. We show that the relationship between tax-enforcement policies, the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure and the elasticity of substitution between formal and informal work is key to explain formal labor supply in major OECD countries. In a model without informal work, there is a positive relationship between the elasticity of substitution and the tax rate on formal income and people tend to work more. This is the case for the United States, Greece, Finland and the United Kingdom. This relationship becomes negative once informal activities are introduced and the model can explain formal labor supply better in countries where agents work relative less, i.e., in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, Norway and Sweden. We also obtain estimates of hours worked in the informal sector for these countries.