Edward J. Lopez (ed.): The pursuit of justice: law and economics of legal institutions

摘要

Public choice theory fundamentally altered the way economists, and other social scientists, analyze government behavior. The positive approach to public economics removes the romance from government highlighting how government actually works, not how we think it ought to work. The 'politics without romance' mentality is no longer confined to strictly analyzing voting rules, political institutions, and politicians' behavior. In The Pursuit of Justice, Lopez has organized a collection of work applying this mentality to law and economics, a relatively new approach to legal studies. Four underlying themes emerge throughout the chapters including (1) the consequences of development takings and the unsound principle of 'just compensation,' (2) how the selection mechanisms of the judiciary structures incentives shaping judicial outcomes, (3) judicial decisions are susceptible to special interest politics, and (4) the market is capable of providing many legal services attributed to government.