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(De)Centralization and voter turnout: theory and evidence from German municipalities

机译:(De)集中化和投票率:德国市政当局的理论和证据

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摘要

A vast academic literature illustrates that voter turnout is affected by the institutional design of elections (e.g., compulsory voting, electoral system, postal or Sunday voting). In this article, we exploit a simple Downsian theoretical framework to argue that the institutional framework of public good provision-and, in particular, the distribution of political and administrative competences across government levels-likewise affects voters' turnout decisions by influencing the expected net benefit of voting. Empirically, we exploit the institutional variation across German municipalities to test this proposition, and find supportive evidence.
机译:大量的学术文献表明,选民的投票率受选举制度设计的影响(例如,强制性投票,选举制度,邮政或星期日投票)。在本文中,我们利用一个简单的唐斯理论框架来论证,公共物品供给的制度框架,尤其是政府层面的政治和行政权限的分布,也会通过影响预期的净收益而影响选民的投票决定。投票。从经验上讲,我们利用德国各个城市的制度差异来检验这一主张,并找到支持性证据。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Public choice》 |2014年第4期|469-483|共15页
  • 作者单位

    Department of Urban Economics, Halle Institute for Economic Research, P.O. Box 11 03 61, 06017 Halle (Saale), Germany;

    Department of Urban Economics, Halle Institute for Economic Research, P.O. Box 11 03 61, 06017 Halle (Saale), Germany,Faculty of Law and Economics, School of Economics and Business, Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg, Grosse Steinstrasse 73,06108 Halle (Saale), Germany;

    Department of Applied Economics, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussel, Belgium,Department of Economics, Norwegian Business School BI, Nydalsveien 37,0442 Oslo, Norway;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Voter turnout; Institutions; Federalism; Paradox of voting;

    机译:选民投票率;机构;联邦制;投票悖论;
  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 23:07:36

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