Revisiting demand, politicization and externalization in authoritarian political regimes: policy advisory system in Russian practices

摘要

This study contributes to debate on three related questions in Policy Advisory System research. Is the Policy Advisory System concept applicable in countries other than developed democracies? How does it function in a state-centred authoritarian regime? How does the authoritarian environment affect tendencies such as "politicization" and "externalization"? These questions are addressed using materials on the current Russian governance structure and advisory practices, focusing on two broadly defined "governance subsystems" in the Presidential Administration of Russia, "Political Bloc" and "Economic Bloc", both acting as regular customers for advisory communities. One finding is the phenomenon of "Dual Demand" from the same centre of power-"stability" for "Political Bloc" and "innovation" for "Economic Bloc"-which contributed to creation of two different clusters of policy advisory agencies with different statuses. Other findings include transformation of "politicization" to policy control mechanisms and attempted "externalization" turning into the reverse-"internalization"-bringing independent advisory organizations under the supervision of government structures.