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The most infamous cyber-attacks on industrial systems

机译:对工业系统最臭名昭着的网络攻击

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摘要

Attacks take place on industrial control systems (ICS) so as to undermine the integrity of processes that may lead to a malicious functional impact, according to a recent paper, "Stuxnet to CRASHOVERRIDE to TRISIS," written by Joe Slowik of Hanover, MD-based Dragos.In these attacks, purpose-built software was leveraged as part of multi-stage attacks that not only sought to undermine system integrity and disrupt the process, but that were also meant to cause destruction or bring coercion to bear.To start, in 2010, Stuxnet was a deliberate attack on Iran's nuclear enrichment activities, performed with complex malware. But rather than simply make centrifuges destroy themselves, Stuxnet caused infected Siemens PLCs to ensure operational degradation, while hiding the cause of the degradation. The malware increased production defect rate even as it decreased centrifuge operational life.
机译:攻击在工业控制系统(ICS)上进行,以破坏可能导致恶意功能影响的流程的完整性,根据joe slowik的汉诺威,MD-写的“Stuxnet到Trisis”,MD-基于Dragos。在这些攻击中,目的地软件被利用,作为多阶段攻击的一部分,不仅试图破坏系统完整性并扰乱过程,而且还意味着造成破坏或带来胁迫。要开始,在2010年,Stuxnet是对伊朗核心活动的审议攻击,与复杂的恶意软件进行。但而不是简单地让离心者摧毁自己,Stuxnet导致感染的西门子PLC,以确保运营退化,同时隐藏降解原因。恶意软件即使在降低离心机的运营生活中也增加了生产缺陷率。

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    《Plant engineering》 |2020年第1期|a4-a4|共1页
  • 作者

    KEVIN PARKER;

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