Fictionalism, Semantics,rnand Ontology

摘要

This article expands upon the argument of a previous work which defended arnvariational account of scientific fictions. Specifically, I show that this understandingrnof scientific fictions can provide guidance for realist interpretations ofrnscientific theories and models. Depending on a model’s variational properties,rndifferent ontological commitments are appropriate, providing a principled wayrnfor a realist to moderate her views according to the structural properties of arngiven model. This reasoning is then applied the Lee-Yang theory and Kubo-rnMartin-Schwinger statistics, two foundational models in quantum statisticalrnmechanics. The Lee-Yang theory is analyzed in a way that permits a robustrnrealist interpretation, whereas KMS statistics is shown to involve a use of fictionsrnthat shields the theory from confirmation and makes it inappropriate for stronglyrnrealist interpretation, without contradicting broadly realist commitments.