Revisiting free riding and the Tit-for-Tat in BitTorrent: A measurement study - Springer

摘要

In this paper we report new results of our continuous effort on analyzing the impact of incentive mechanisms on user behavior in BitTorrent. In this second measurement and analysis study we find that free riders’ population has significantly increased comparing to our previous measurement study. We relate this increase to the advance in end-users’ connection speeds and to users’ increased knowledge in BitTorrent. We also categorize free riders based on the behavior they exhibit in multiple-torrent system into three types: cheaters, strategic and lucky peers. Furthermore, refuting the findings of other studies, we show that peers who exploit the system in BitTorrent are both high bandwidth capacity peers and low bandwidth capacity peers. Moreover, we argue that the Tit-for-Tat mechanism does not discriminate peers based on their bandwidth capacities and that it reacts successfully against inter-class bandwidth capacity strategic peers. Finally, we propose a memory-backoff approach to the optimistic unchoke policy that reduces the volume of free riding in BitTorrent.