Pareto analysis of supply chain contracts under satisf icing objectives

摘要

The supply chain is assumed to have risk-neutral manufacturer and retailer where the manufacturer determines the wholesale price and the retailer determines the order quantity. Under the condition of risk averseness, the retailer may be interested in maximizing the probability of making profit or in other words, make sure of the survival under extreme competitive conditions. This paper examines the performance of three supply chain contracts, push, pull, and advance-purchase discount (APD) under various manufacturer and retailer objectives. A push contract is where the retailer orders the whole quantity before the selling season and pays a single wholesale price. A pull contract is where the retailer replenishes inventory as needed during the season at a single wholesale price higher than the push contract's wholesale price. The APD contract is a combination of both where the retailer pre-books some quantity and then replenishes inventory as needed. These three contracts are examined under three conditions namely, when both manufacturer and retailer have satisficing objectives, only the retailer has a satisficing objective, or only the manufacturer has a satisficing objective. (31 refs.)