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Bargaining Power and Value Sharing in Distribution Networks: A Cooperative Game Theory Approach

机译:分销网络中的议价能力和价值共享:一种合作博弈的方法

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This paper introduces a novel methodology for analyzing bargaining games on network markets, which are markets where transactions occur by means of distribution networks (e.g., gas, electric energy, water, etc.). The overall economic surplus obtained in the market is distributed among all network agents the on the basis of their bargaining power, which in turn depends on a variety of factors: position of each agent (e.g., a country) in the network, reliability in the cooperation scheme (e.g., geo-political stability), existence of market distortions and availability of outside options (e.g., alternative energy sources). The method we propose, which is illustrated here through an application to a fictitious network structure, is based on a two-stage process: first, a network optimization model is used to generate payoff values under different coalitions and network structures; second, cooperative game solutions are identified. Any change in the network structure entails both a variation in the overall welfare level and in the distribution of surplus among agents, as it affects their relative bargaining power. Therefore, expected costs and benefits, at the aggregate as well as at the individual level, can be compared to assess the economic viability of any investment in network infrastructure. A number of model variants and extensions are also considered: changing demand, exogenous instability factors, market distortions, externalities and outside options.
机译:本文介绍了一种用于分析网络市场上的讨价还价博弈的新颖方法,网络是通过配电网络(例如,天然气,电能,水等)进行交易的市场。市场上获得的总体经济剩余会根据其议价能力在所有网络代理商之间分配,而议价能力又取决于多种因素:每个代理商(例如一个国家)在网络中的位置,在网络中的可靠性。合作计划(例如,地缘政治稳定),市场扭曲的存在和外部选择权(例如,替代能源)的可用性。我们提出的方法(在此通过一个虚拟网络结构的应用进行说明)基于两个阶段的过程:首先,使用网络优化模型来生成不同联盟和网络结构下的收益值。第二,确定合作游戏解决方案。网络结构的任何变化都将导致整体福利水平的变化以及代理商之间的剩余分配的变化,因为这会影响他们的相对议价能力。因此,可以将预期的成本和收益(无论是总体还是个人)进行比较,以评估对网络基础架构进行的任何投资的经济可行性。还考虑了许多模型变体和扩展:不断变化的需求,外部不稳定因素,市场扭曲,外部性和外部选择权。

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