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Qualitative Axioms of Uncertainty as a Foundation for Probability and Decision-Making

机译:不确定性定性公理作为概率和决策的基础

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Although the concept of uncertainty is as old as Epicurus's writings, and an excellent quantitative theory, with entropy as the measure of uncertainty having been developed in recent times, there has been little exploration of the qualitative theory. The purpose of the present paper is to give a qualitative axiomatization of uncertainty, in the spirit of the many studies of qualitative comparative probability. The qualitative axioms are fundamentally about the uncertainty of a partition of the probability space of events. Of course, it is common to speak of the uncertainty, or randomness, of a random variable, but only the partition defined by the values of the random variable enter into the definition of uncertainty, not the actual values. It is straightforward to add axioms for decision making following the general line of Savage from the 1950s. Indeed, in the spirit of Epicurus, it is really our intuitive feeling about the uncertainty of the future that motivates much of our thinking about decisions. Here, the distinction between the concepts of probability and uncertainty can be made by citing many familiar examples. Without spelling out the technical details, the axiomatization of qualitative probability with uncertainty as the most important primitive concept, it is possible to raise a different kind of question about bounded rationality. This new question is whether or not one should bound the uncertainty in thinking and investigating any detailed framework of decision making. Discussion of this point is certainly different from the question of bounding rationality by not maximizing expected utility. In practice, we naturally bound uncertainty in our analysis of decision-making problems. As in the case of formulating an alternative for maximizing expected utility, so is the case of rational alternatives to maximizing uncertainty. There are several issues to consider. In the spirit of my other work in qualitative probability, I explore alternatives rather than attempt to give a definitive argument for one single solution.
机译:尽管不确定性的概念与Epicurus的著作一样古老,并且是一种出色的定量理论,但近年来以熵作为不确定性的度量标准已经得到了发展,但对定性理论的探索却很少。本文的目的是本着许多定性比较概率研究的精神,给出不确定性的定性公理化。定性公理从根本上讲是关于事件概率空间划分的不确定性。当然,谈到随机变量的不确定性或随机性是很常见的,但是只有由随机变量的值定义的分区才进入不确定性的定义,而不是实际值。可以根据1950年代的“野人”一般路线添加决策公理。确实,本着Epicurus的精神,实际上是我们对未来不确定性的直觉,激发了我们对决策的许多思考。在这里,可以通过引用许多熟悉的示例来区分概率和不确定性的概念。在没有详细说明技术细节,具有不确定性的定性概率公理化这一最重要的原始概念的情况下,有可能提出另一种关于有限理性的问题。这个新问题是,是否应该限制思考和调查任何详细决策框架的不确定性。关于这一点的讨论肯定与没有通过最大化预期效用来限制合理性的问题不同。在实践中,我们自然会对决策问题的分析带来不确定性。就像制定替代方案以最大化预期效用一样,合理替代方案也可以最大化不确定性。有几个问题要考虑。本着定性概率本着其他工作的精神,我探索替代方法,而不是试图为一个解决方案给出确定的论据。

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