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首页> 外文期刊>Marketing Science >Vaporware, Suddenware, and True ware: New Product Preannouncements Under Market Uncertainty
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Vaporware, Suddenware, and True ware: New Product Preannouncements Under Market Uncertainty

机译:蒸气软件,突变软件和真件:市场不确定性下的新产品预发布

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Afirm may want to preannounce its plans to develop a new product in order to stimulate future demand. But given that such communications can affect rivals' incentives to develop the same new product, a firm may decide to preannounce untruthfully in order to deter competitors. We examine an incumbent's preannouncement strategy when there is uncertainty regarding the commercial viability of a new product opportunity and a threat of rival entry. Each firm has a private assessment of the market potential for the new product. Two competitive incentives arise for the incumbent in terms of discouraging rival entry: it can use preemptive communication or it can remain silent and instill a pessimistic market potential outlook. We find that an incumbent prefers to follow a vaporware strategy-i.e., declares plans to pursue a new product opportunity even when it may have no development intentions-when its market forecasting capabilities are weak and the demand-side benefits from preannouncing are small. By contrast, when the incumbent has strong market forecasting capabilities and the demand-side benefits are small, the incumbent adopts a suddenware strategy-i.e., remains silent about its new product plans even when it actually plans to develop the new product. Finally, when its market forecasting capabilities are strong and the demand-side benefits are large, the incumbent prefers to engage in a trueware strategy-i.e., truthfully preannounces development plans. We show that an interplay between competition-related and demand-related considerations is what allows trueware to emerge as an equilibrium in the absence of any ex post cost to engaging in vaporware. In an extension, we let the incumbent's actual development plans leak out and allow the entrant to wait and learn those plans prior to setting a research and development level. We identify conditions for the entrant to postpone development despite the risk of being late to market, as well as conditions for the entrant to commence development immediately despite not knowing the incumbent's plans based on the observed preannouncement strategy.
机译:Afirm可能希望预先宣布其开发新产品的计划,以刺激未来的需求。但是,鉴于此类交流会影响竞争对手开发相同新产品的动机,因此公司可能会决定不诚实地预先宣布,以阻止竞争对手。当对新产品机会的商业可行性和竞争对手进入的威胁存在不确定性时,我们将检查任职者的预发布策略。每家公司都会对新产品的市场潜力进行私人评估。就阻止竞争对手进入市场而言,现任企业有两种竞争动机:可以采用先发制人的沟通方式,或者可以保持沉默,并灌输悲观的市场潜力前景。我们发现,在位者更喜欢遵循蒸汽软件策略-即宣布计划寻求新产品的机会,即使它可能没有开发意图-当其市场预测能力较弱且预先宣布的需求方收益很小时。相比之下,当任职者具有强大的市场预测能力且需求方收益较小时,任职者将采用突然软件策略-即即使实际上计划开发新产品,也对其新产品计划保持沉默。最后,当其市场预测能力强且需求方收益大时,老牌企业更愿意采用真正的软件战略,即如实地预先宣布开发计划。我们证明,与竞争相关的需求和与需求相关的考虑之间的相互作用是,在不存在从事汽具的任何事后成本的情况下,允许真品作为平衡出现的原因。作为扩展,我们让任职者的实际开发计划泄漏出去,并允许进入者在设置研发水平之前等待并学习这些计划。我们确定了进入者推迟开发的条件,尽管它们有可能迟到市场,并且,尽管基于所观察到的预告策略不知道现任者的计划,也可以确定进入者立即开始开发的条件。

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