China's WTO Compliance-Plus Anti-dumping Policy

摘要

Is China complying with its World Trade Organization (WTO) anti-dumping (AD) commitments? The strong import competition created by the rapid opening of China's domestic market and the continued state involvement in its industry could conceivably generate domestic pressure on the Chinese government to use AD measures intensively and possibly illegally. Moreover, since its exports are a primary global target of AD actions, China might be expected to retaliate by levying questionable AD measures on imports. Despite factors conducive to a more protectionist bias and possible non-compliance, I argue that China is not only complying with AD rules but also detnonstrating domestic restraint, and to a certain extent, a pro-liberalization interpretation of the rules. This policy along with China's Doha Round negotiating proposals on AD suggests what is characterized in this article as a compliance-plus policy. The fact that China has chosen to pursue such a policy is not trivial, taking into account the more protectionist paths taken by other key WTO members. On a broader level, this case study aims at contributing to the contemporary debate regarding China's changing role in the global arena. By complying with WTO rules, China is demonstrating that it is accepting, following, and becoming increasingly vested in their maintenance.