Colombian Military Thinking and the Fight against the FARC-EP Insurgency, 2002-2014

摘要

This article attempts to place in historical perspective the latest effort by Colombia's military (Colmil) to defeat the now half century old insurgency of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejercito del Pueblo (FARC-EP). It argues that the surge' initiated under President alvaro Uribe in 2002 with the assistance of the United States can only be fully analyzed in the context of the Colmil's intellectual framework for counter-insurgency. Specifically, this article will explain how the protracted engagement with counter-insurgency has shaped the Colmil's understanding of the nature of the conflict, as well as its attitudes towards its adversary, civil authority and the instrumentality of force. An understanding of the Colmil's strategic tradition can also help to explain their apprehensions about the ongoing peace negotiations with the FARC-EP.