Trade sanctions, financial transfers and BRIC participation in global climate change negotiations

摘要

Two effects are at issue in evaluating country incentives to participate in global carbon emission initiatives: a utility loss from reduced consumption due to reduced use of fossil fuels and a gain from lowered temperature change. The latter accrues to all countries. Own country emissions reductions are typically not in the self interest of countries and hence countries will not participate in global climate negotiations, unless the perceived damage from climate change is very large and much larger than damage estimates in the Stern review.rnWe use Stern based damage estimates and investigate how the incentives for large population low wage rapidly growing countries in the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India, China) to participate in global climate change negotiations both as a sub-global coalition and individually can be affected by penalties (tariffs) inflicted or financial transfers made to them by the OECD. We assess what levels of other country trade measures linked to non-participation are needed to induce compliance as an all or nothing discrete choice. We also analyze participation linked to financial transfers.rnWe use a general equilibrium model calibrated to a 2006-2056 base case, and capture induced changes in the global trade equilibrium in our analyses. Our results suggest that only very high tariffs of over a hundred percent by all other countries, or even higher tariffs by the OECD alone, could induce participation by BRIC countries. Equally, large financial transfers would be needed.