Multi- or Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Revisiting the Issue

摘要

The multi- or internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle was heavily discussed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially with regard to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The discussions mainly took place in the framework of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) conference, which started in Washington, D.C., in October 1977. In the following two years, eight international working groups evaluated the advantages and challenges of various approaches for the nuclear fuel cycle to build on models of multi- or international cooperation. It was identified that given the appropriate administrative authority, both multi-nationalization and internationalization have a potential to significantly increase the proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel cycle, thus contributing to the objectives of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), especially the spirit of Article IV. However, implementing such cooperational models also would have disadvantages, especially in the areas of political independence, transfer of technologies, and planning security of national nuclear programs. To date, only a few examples of such multinational cooperation have been implemented. In view of recent changes in global politics, technology developments in the nuclear field, and the availability of state-of-the-art safeguards equipment and procedures, it is worth reconsidering the subject and examining whether the concerns and conclusions of the INFCE working groups are still valid. It should be further considered what type of multi- and internationalization would seem both feasible and appropriate to increase the proliferation resistance of the fuel cycle. First, this paper will recall the concept and conclusions of the INFCE investigations and describe existing forms of bi- or multilateral cooperation. Next, this paper will assess the advantages and drawbacks of internationalization in terms of economics and transparency. To conclude, this paper will judge the attractiveness of the different models with regard to administrative and economic feasibility in view of nonproliferation and enhancements in relation with the NPT and the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540).