How to Organize Pricing? Vertical Delegation and Horizontal Dispersion of Pricing Authority

摘要

Although pricing is one of the strongest drivers of profitability, little empirical research has examined how a firm should organize pricing internally. This research draws on the information-processing view of organizational design to conceptualize a framework of how firms organize their pricing authority both within the sales function and across the sales, marketing, and finance functions. The authors find a nonlinear, inverted U-shaped relationship between the vertical delegation of pricing authority and profitability as well as a positive relationship between the horizontal dispersion of pricing authority across sales, marketing, and finance and profitability. Another key finding is a positive interaction between vertical delegation and horizontal dispersion, indicating that firms need to jointly design vertical delegation and horizontal dispersion. In addition, the results identify price-related market dynamism as a moderator of the horizontal dispersion of the pricing authority-profitability relationship and emphasis on margin-based incentives as a moderator of vertical delegation of the pricing authority-profitability relationship. The authors also analyze the relationship between the organizational design of pricing authority and sales growth.