Strategy and war planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918

摘要

Historians are often undecided about whether to give primacy to continuity or change. Dr Grimes cleaves to continuity. His introductory section on the nineteenth century up to the 1880s illustrates his approach well: the Royal Navy, we are told, showed great consistency in its policy, deterring foreign enemies through promises of powerful retaliation on trade and coastal establishments. Moreover, we are to see consistent and coherent planning behind these promises, largely due to the Hydrographer's Department, which for long after its establishment in 1795 was apparently the Admiralty planning staff. Much remained the same, one gathers, in the period Grimes concentrates upon, from 1887 to 1918. By this time, or at least until about 1908, the Intelligence Department was mainly responsible for planning, but the planning as described conforms to precedent. Once again, it is argued that Admiralty policy concentrated upon offensive action, with particular attention to strikes against enemy coastal positions, though when Germany became the principal likely opponent (after around 1902), these strikes might be intended as mere preparatory moves for large-scale operations in the Baltic. Action against the German economy through trade war was by no means excluded, we are told, but is to be seen as secondary.