The corporate governance of Benedictine abbeys: What can stock corporations learn from monasteries?

摘要

Purpose - This paper aims to analyse the governance structure of monasteries to gain new insightsrnand apply them to solve agency problems of modern corporations. In an historic analysis of crises andrnclosures it asks, if Benedictine monasteries were and are capable of solving agency problems. Thernanalysis shows that monasteries established basic governance instruments very early and thereforernwere able to survive for centuries.rnDesign/methodology/approach - The paper uses a dataset of all Benedictine abbeys that everrnexisted in Bavaria, Baden-Wurttemberg, and German-speaking Switzerland to determine their lifespanrnand the reasons for closures. The governance mechanisms are analyzed in detail. Finally, it drawsrnconclusions relevant to the modern corporation. The theoretical foundations are based upon principalrnagency theory, psychological economics, as well as embeddedness theory.rnFindings - The monasteries that are examined show an average lifetime of almost 500 years andrnonly a quarter of them dissolved as a result of agency problems. This paper argues that this success isrndue to an appropriate governance structure that relies strongly on internal control mechanisms.rnResearch limitations/implications - Benedictine monasteries and stock corporations differrnfundamentally regarding their goals. Additional limitations of the monastic approach are the tendencyrnto promote groupthink, the danger of dictatorship and the life long commitment.rnPractical implications - The paper adds new insights into the corporate governance debaterndesigned to solve current agency problems and facilitate better control.rnOriginality/value - By analyzing monasteries, a new approach is offered to understand thernefficiency of internal behavioral incentives and their combination with external control mechanisms inrncorporate governance.