Neither Stakeholder Nor Shareholder Theories': How Property Right and Contract Theory can Help in Getting Out of the Dilemma

摘要

A core problem in relating PRT and STHV is that the first is a theory, while the second is not. The STHV has developed mainly as a reaction to the 'shareholder value' movement and view of the firm, which, in turn, is also not a theory (Grandori, 2004a). Neither the shareholder nor the stakeholder 'views' of the firm, before being right or wrong, are 'theories' because they are assertions on who the principals of the firm should be, under conditions of effectiveness. Hence, they are propositions that should be derived from some theory. As it has been widely noticed, the proposition that anyone whose payoff or welfare is affected by a firm existence and behavior (has a 'stake' in the firm) is entitled to a 'right' in its property (usually thought of as some residual decision and control right), has no clear conceptual foundation and is overly broad (Blair, 2005), makes the task of designing governance structures unmanageable (Aoki, 2004), and is a 'universalistic,' non-contingent statement unable to explain systematic variations in governance structures (Grandori, 2004a). Therefore, the AMM contribution is quite appropriately looking for a missing theoretical foundation for that view. Can property right theory be the one? How tightly is PRT linked to the 'shareholder view'? (SHHV)