A troubled relationship: corruption and reform of the public sector in development

摘要

Purpose - This paper aims to present an analysis of the nature and determinants of corruption,rnusing recent data to clarify the nature of the corruption phenomenon and answer the question ofrnwhether corruption can categorically be said to be a problem requiring public sector reform, or is arnconsequence of it.rnDesign/methodology/approach - The paper analyses data on corruption in relation to the timingrnof the introduction of public sector reform in recent economic transitions, and examines the persistencernof increased corruption following the introduction of reforms.rnFindings - The theoretical model suggests that events that negatively affect administrators inrnpositions of trust create some reactive tendency towards corruption, and this is supported by thernevidence from transition economies. There is a significant increase in corruption following transitionalrneconomies' public sector reform, and this demonstrates an unusual degree of persistence even afterrngeneral institutional reforms have been completed.rnResearch limitations/implications - Further research could try alternative measures ofrncorruption, instead of "perceptions" data analysed here, and examine the strength of persistencernacross a larger set of countries to test the confounding effect of other institutional reforms in therntransition countries examined.rnPractical implications - The costs of new public management reform programmes are broaderrnthan is currently suggested, and significant short- to medium-term deterioration might be expected inrnthe aftermath of reform.rnOriginality/value - The paper provides a new approach to corruption research examining thernimportance of the corruption "tipping points" of individual administrators and how these arernsignificant in modelling corruption.