Short-term success, long-term failure? Explaining the signalling effects of EU misappropriation sanctions following revolutionary events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Ukraine

摘要

When the Tunisian (2011), Egyptian (2011), and Ukrainian (2014) regimes were ousted, the EU answered the calls of new leaders to freeze the dethroned leaders' assets. These assets were widely thought to have been accumulated by the leaders' strategic misappropriation of state funds during their time in office. This article analyses why the EU struggles to make a long-term success out of misappropriation sanctions. It does so by conceptualising 'effectiveness' as the attainment of signalling objectives. Even though misappropriation sanctions successfully sent a quick signal of support to new authorities and local populations, the EU and its member states fail to sustain this signal of support because they struggle to return frozen assets to the new authorities. Here, a framework of both micro- and macro-factors explains why little progress has been made towards repatriating recovered assets. Building on 33 expert interviews, the article concludes that, to improve the effectiveness of misappropriation sanctions, the EU should act quickly when freezing assets and assist new authorities in investigating corruption cases. Swift action deters sanctions evasion and softens the harmful effects of individuals targeted for sanctions protesting against their listing.