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Foreign exchange intervention and the political business cycle: A panel data analysis

机译:外汇干预与政治经济周期:面板数据分析

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By combining expansionary open-market operations with sales of foreign exchange, the central bank can expand the monetary base without depreciating the exchange rate. Thus, if there is a monetary political business cycle, sales of foreign exchange are especially likely before elections. Our panel data analysis for up to 149 countries in 1975-2001 supports this hypothesis. Foreign exchange reserves relative to trend GDP depend negatively on the pre-election index. The relationship is significant and robust irrespective of the type of electoral variable, our choice of control variables and the splitting of the sample period. However, it is not significant in a narrow sample of high income countries. Foreign exchange reserves also drop relative to the domestic component of the monetary base prior to elections while the overall monetary stimulus is positive.
机译:通过将扩张性的公开市场操作与外汇销售相结合,中央银行可以在不降低汇率贬值的情况下扩大货币基础。因此,如果存在货币政治经济周期,则在选举前特别有可能出售外汇。我们在1975-2001年对149个国家进行的面板数据分析支持了这一假设。相对于趋势GDP的外汇储备负面依赖于大选前指数。无论选举变量的类型,我们选择的控制变量和采样周期的划分如何,这种关系都是显着且稳定的。但是,在少数高收入国家中这并不重要。相对于大选前货币基础的国内组成部分而言,外汇储备也有所下降,而总体货币刺激措施是积极的。

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