There has been a giant growth in complexity and severity of DDoS attacks from the last past decade. Major research has focused solely on technical solutions. Economic solutions based on incentives have not been given attention. Every DDoS attack is driven by some strong incentive of an attacker. DDoS attacks can only be tackled by providing incentives to legitimate users and at the same time by making attacker deprived of the same. In this paper, VCG-based bidding mechanism has been presented to handle DDoS attacks. VCG is an economic approach used to allocate public good fairly among users. Proposed approach is inherently incentive compatible where attackers do not have any incentive to announce false bid value. Along with making attacker incentive-less, proposed approach is satisfying desirable properties like truthfulness, incentive compatibility, allocative efficiency, and individual rationality. Experimentations have been conducted for proposed method using Java. Output graphs have shown satisfying above mentioned properties.
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