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Guns First, Talks Later: Neoconservatives and the Northern Ireland Peace Process

机译:先开枪,后谈:新保守派与北爱尔兰和平进程

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The Northern Ireland peace process emerged from ‘behind the scenes’ when contacts between the British government and Sinn Féin were revealed in November 1993. On 31st August 1994, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) declared a ceasefire and in April 1998 the Good Friday Agreement achieved a power-sharing accommodation based on the moderate political parties. By 2003, the hardline Democratic Unionist Party was electorally dominant among unionists and Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA, among nationalists. Remarkably, in May 2007, the ‘hardline’ parties agreed to share power. The Northern Ireland peace process appears to represent an apparently successful case of two democratic governments—the British and Irish—negotiating with ‘the enemy’ to achieve a power-sharing accommodation. This success has led to various actors with competing political agendas claiming to have discovered ‘the lessons’ of Northern Ireland for other areas in conflict. The Labour government's ‘Orthodox’ interpretation suggests that it is always, or nearly always, a good idea to talk to the enemy. More recently, an ‘orthodox Neoconservative’ interpretation of the peace process has argued that Northern Ireland is the exception which proves the rule that it is almost never right to ‘talk to terrorists’ or ‘negotiate with evil’. These contrasting interpretations of the ‘Northern Ireland model’ are used by analysts and policy-makers to advocate talking or not talking to groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the ‘Sunni’ militias in Iraq, Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The ‘orthodox Neoconservative’ interpretation of the peace process argues that the IRA were defeated, partly due to the efficacy of the ‘dirty war’, and in negotiating the peace process British governments did not compromise core values and democratic norms. This article argues that this account of the peace process is inaccurate and that the ‘lessons’ derived by Neoconservatives from the peace process are flawed.View full textDownload full textRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2011.615609
机译:当1993年11月英国政府与辛恩·芬(SinnFéin)接触时,北爱尔兰的和平进程就从“幕后”出现。1994年8月31日,爱尔兰共和军(IRA)宣布停火,4月1998年,《耶稣受难日协定》在温和政党的基础上实现了权力共享。到2003年,强硬的民主联盟党在民族主义者中在选举中占主导地位,而在工会主义者和辛恩·芬因(IRA的政治部门)中占据选举地位。值得注意的是,2007年5月,“强硬路线”各方同意分享权力。北爱尔兰的和平进程似乎代表了两个民主政府-英国和爱尔兰-与“敌人”进行谈判以实现权力共享的调解的成功案例。这一成功导致各种行动者的政治议程相互竞争,声称他们发现了北爱尔兰在冲突中其他地区的“教训”。工党政府对“东正教”的解释表明,与敌人对话总是或几乎总是一个好主意。最近,对和平进程的“正统的新保守派”解释认为,北爱尔兰是一个例外,这证明了“与恐怖分子交谈”或“与邪恶进行谈判”几乎永远是不正确的规则。 €™。分析人员和政策制定者使用对“北爱尔兰模式”的这些不同解释来主张与诸如哈马斯,真主党,伊拉克的“逊尼派”民兵,基地组织和塔利班。对和平进程的“正统的新保守主义”解释认为,爱尔兰共和军被击败,部分原因是“肮脏战争”的效力,英国政府在和平进程的谈判中并未损害核心价值观和民主规范。本文认为,这种对和平进程的描述是不准确的,新保守主义者从和平进程中得出的“教训”是有缺陷的。 ::“ citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,美味,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,更多”,pubid:“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2011.615609

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