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Leverage, Moral Hazard, and Liquidity

机译:杠杆,道德风险和流动性

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Financial firms raise short-term debt to finance asset purchases; this induces risk shifting when economic conditions worsen and limits their ability to roll over debt. Constrained firms de-lever by selling assets to lower-leverage firms. In turn, asset-market liquidity depends on the system-wide distribution of leverage, which is itself endogenous to future economic prospects. Good economic prospects yield cheaper short-term debt, inducing entry of higher-leverage firms. Consequently, adverse asset shocks in good times lead to greater de-leveraging and sudden drying up of market and funding liquidity.
机译:金融公司筹集短期债务以为资产购买提供资金;当经济状况恶化时,这会引发风险转移,并限制其结转债务的能力。受约束的公司通过向低杠杆公司出售资产来实现杠杆。反过来,资产市场的流动性取决于整个系统的杠杆分布,而杠杆本身是未来经济前景的内生因素。良好的经济前景会产生较便宜的短期债务,从而促使高杠杆公司进入。因此,不良资产冲击在繁荣时期会导致更大程度的去杠杆化,以及市场和资金流动性突然枯竭。

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