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Growth, income distribution, and the 'entrepreneurial state'

机译:增长,收入分配和“创业状态”

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摘要

In this paper, we introduce a twofold role for the public sector in the Goodwin (1967) model of the growth cycle. The government collects income taxes in order to: (a) invest in infrastructure capital, which directly affects the production possibilities of the economy; (b) finance publicly-funded research and development (R&D), which augments the growth rate of labor productivity. We study two versions of the model, with and without induced technical change; that is, with or without a feedback from the labor share to labor productivity growth. In both cases we show that: (i) provided that the output-elasticity of infrastructure is greater than the elasticity of labor productivity growth to public R&D, there exists a tax rate that maximizes the long-run labor share, and it is smaller than the growth-maximizing tax rate; (ii) the long-run share of labor is always increasing in the share of public spending in infrastructure; (iii) different taxation schemes can affect the stability of growth cycles.
机译:在本文中,我们在增长周期的古德温(1967)模型中为公共部门引入了双重角色。政府征收所得税是为了:(a)投资于基础设施资本,这直接影响经济的生产可能性; (b)资助公共研究与开发,以提高劳动生产率的增长率。我们研究了模型的两个版本,有无技术变更。也就是说,有或没有劳动份额对劳动生产率增长的反馈。在这两种情况下,我们都表明:(i)如果基础设施的产出弹性大于劳动生产率对公共研发的弹性,则存在一个税率,该税率可使长期劳动份额最大化,并且小于增长最大化税率; (ii)长期的劳动力份额在基础设施的公共支出份额中一直在增加; (iii)不同的税收计划会影响增长周期的稳定性。

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