Coasean bargaining in the presence of Pigouvian taxation

摘要

Coasean arguments against the Pigouvian perspective are well established. A central tenet in this criticism argues that a Pigouvian tax may be a source of inefficiency: if parties were to bargain in the presence of a Pigouvian tax, (allocative) inefficiencies would occur the so-called Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem. By analyzing a Coasean environment where the appropriation of property rights is costly, we show Coasean bargaining in the presence of a pre-existing (Pigouvian) tax may be superior. This has implications for policy where dual regulatory environments exist, such as regulation at the state and federal level, as well as environmental liability and litigation. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.