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The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks

机译:经销商银行的失败机制

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摘要

A bank is conventionally viewed as an intermediary between depositors, who desire short-term liquidity, and borrowers, who seek project financing. Occasionally, perhaps from an unexpected surge in the cash withdrawals of depositors or from a shock to the ability of borrowers to repay their loans, depositors may become concerned over the bank's solvency. Depositors may then "run," accelerating or worsening the bank's failure. The standard policy tools for treating the social costs of bank failures include regulatory supervision and risk-based capital requirements to reduce the chance of a solvency threatening loss of capital; deposit insurance to reduce the incentives of individual depositors to trigger cash insolvency by racing each other to withdraw their deposits; and regulatory resolution mechanisms, which give authorities the power to efficiently restructure or liquidate a bank.
机译:传统上,银行被视为需要短期流动性的存款人与寻求项目融资的借款人之间的中介。有时,也许是由于储户的现金提取意外增加,或是由于借款人还贷能力受到冲击,储户可能会担心银行的偿付能力。然后,储户可能会“奔跑”,从而加速或加剧银行的倒闭。处理银行倒闭的社会成本的标准政策工具包括监管监督和基于风险的资本要求,以减少有偿付能力威胁资本损失的机会;存款保险,以减少彼此争夺存款以触发个人现金破产的动机;以及监管机构的解决机制,使当局有权有效地重组或清算银行。

著录项

  • 来源
    《The journal of economic perspectives》 |2010年第1期|51-72|共22页
  • 作者

    Darrell Duffie;

  • 作者单位

    Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);美国《化学文摘》(CA);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 23:25:33

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