The Evolution of Environmental Legislation: A Strategic Transaction Approach

摘要

Environmental pollution is often a by-product of agricultural production. This by-product is different from other industrial pollution because (1) the cause and effect relationship between agricultural practice and environmental impact is uncertain, (2) there is a large amount of heterogeneity in the physical characteristics of agricultural production units, and (3) a large portion of agricultural pollution is characterized by non-point source pollution (Carpentier and Erwin 2002; Weersink et al. 1998). These types of problems often occur with intensive livestock operations, and in particular with hog production, in many parts of the world (OECD 2000). Market mechanisms may not provide workable solutions to these types of negative externality situations. As a result, a conflict of interests arises among individuals, producers, and surrounding residents that must be resolved. It is this conflict of interest that provides the driving force behind institutional change. This paper investigates the institutional evolution of environmental legislation in Quebec that affects agricultural production and the role collective action plays in identifying and selecting working rules. J. R. Commons' framework of strategic and routine transactions provides the motivation for individual and collective action over time (Commons 1931, 1961; Rutherford 1983). This proposed framework is also used to examine current activities of both producer groups and the public who are trying to assert control over the limiting factor that future routine transactions will be based upon. The interaction among individuals, collective groups, government departments, and the legislature is identified. The choice of working rules that are implemented in legislation provides distinct sets of incentives for individual and agricultural producer behavior.