Neuroeconomics: Infeasible and Underdetermined

摘要

Advocates of neuroeconomics claim to offer the prospect of creating a unified behavioral theory by drawing upon the techniques of neuroscience and psychology and combining them with economic theory. Ostensibly, through the direct measurement of our thoughts, economics and social science will be revolutionized. Such claims have been subject to critique from mainstream and non-mainstream economists alike. Many of these criticisms relate to measurability, relevance, and coherence. In this article, we seek to contribute to this critical examination by investigating the potential of underdetermination, such as the statement that testing involves the conjunction of auxiliary assumptions, and that consequently it may not be possible to isolate the effect of any given hypothesis. We argue that neuroeconomics is especially sensitive to issues of underdetermination. Institutional economists should be cautious of neuroeconomists' zeal as they appear to over-interpret experimental findings and, therefore, neuroeconomics may provide a false prospectus seeking to reinforce the nostrums of homo economicus.