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Rewards versus punishments in additive, weakest-link, and best-shot contests

机译:加性,最弱链接和最佳比赛中的奖励与惩罚

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摘要

In this study, we provide a theory to explain how bottom punishment or top reward enhances performance of teams when there is heterogeneity across players in cost-performance relationships. In contrast to the existing literature, we consider three types of performance functions: additive, weakest link (the performance is the min of performances of n contestants), and best shot (the performance is the max of performances of n contestants). For any of the three types, we derive easy-to-check sufficient conditions to judge whether reward or punishment is better. From the sufficient condition for the additive performance function, we know that punishment is better for less heterogeneous people and reward is better for more heterogeneous people. In addition, the sufficient conditions for the best-shot and weakest-link cases suggest that some unintuitive results hold; even under the best-shot (weakest link) performance function, the bottom punishment (top reward) becomes better when the gap in the abilities of contestants becomes very small (large). (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:在这项研究中,我们提供了一种理论来解释当成本绩效关系中各个参与者之间存在异质性时,最低处分或最高奖励会如何提高团队的绩效。与现有文献相反,我们考虑了三种绩效函数:加性,最弱链接(绩效是n个参赛者的表现的最小值)和最佳击球(绩效是n个参赛者的表现的最大值)。对于这三种类型中的任何一种,我们都得出易于检查的充分条件,以判断奖励还是惩罚是更好的。从附加性能函数的充分条件,我们知道,对于异类较少的人,惩罚更好,而异类较多的人,报酬更好。另外,对于最佳选择和最弱链接的情况,有足够的条件表明存在一些不直观的结果。即使在最佳表现(最弱链接)的表现功能下,当选手的能力差距变得很小(很大)时,最低惩罚(最高奖励)也会变得更好。 (C)2015 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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