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To control or to compromise? The prominence of chief compliance officer and foreign corrupt practices act violation

机译:控制或妥协?首席官员和国外腐败实践的突出行为违反行为

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摘要

We investigate the influence of chief compliance office (CCO) prominence in the corporate management team on FCPA violation and audit fees. Based on the compliance function leader's position seniority, we find that a CCO's position rank is positively associated with the propensity of FCPA violation. It indicates that promoting CCO in the firm can facilitate more aggressive compliance policies-it is a "compromise" instead of a "control." We also find that CCO prominence is positively associated with audit fees even without an FCPA violation happening, which implies that auditors could fully perceive the potential risks embedded in the compliance chief's promotion. The results of this study can be of interest to audit practitioners as well as regulators to better monitor the firms with higher FCPA violation risks.
机译:我们调查首席合规办事处(CCO)突出对FCPA违规和审计费用的企业管理团队的影响。根据合规函数领导者的职位资历,我们发现CCO的立场等级与FCPA违规的倾向呈积极相关。它表明,促进公司中的CCO可以促进更具侵略性的合规政策 - 这是一个“妥协”而不是“控制”。我们还发现,即使没有FCPA违规,CCO突出也与审计费用积极相关,这意味着审计员可以充分认识到合规酋长促进中嵌入的潜在风险。本研究的结果可能对审计从业者以及监管机构更好地监控公司,以更高的FCPA违规风险监控公司。

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