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How does alliance-based government-university-industry foster cleantech innovation in a green innovation ecosystem?

机译:联盟的政府 - 大学 - 工业如何在绿色创新生态系统中培养清洁技术创新?

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Addressing the high research and development risk and negative externality of existing green technology alliances, the Chinese government is focusing on the green innovation ecosystem to facilitate the green collaborative innovation activities of the government-university-industry alliance. However, green innovation ecosystems often suffer from insufficient stability because of high costs, low profits, and long-term return on investment for cleantech innovation. The existing literature analyzed the impact of environmental regulation on cleantech innovation and the effect of innovation ecosystem on the function and role of multi-agent collaborative innovation. However, what are key factors affecting the stabilization of the green innovation ecosystem, and what the effects of environmental regulation policies on the multi-agent collaborative innovation in this ecosystem? To fill these gaps, unlike previous studies in the green innovation literature, this study employed game-based theory to reveal the game strategy changes during the green innovation process, and examine the evolutionary game mechanism of environmental regulation in university-industry ecological innovation alliances. On this basis, the case simulation method is used to change parameter values to simulate key factors that affect the stability of the green innovation ecosystem in multi-agent collaborative innovation. Research shows that there will be two final strategies for evolutionary game analysis: first, industry groups and university groups will adopt the collaborative innovation strategy; second. industry groups and university groups will adopt the betrayal alliance strategy. In the market mechanism, higher default costs and the distribution ratio of research and development costs and green innovation benefits are key factors effecting the stabilization of the green innovation ecosystem. However, the introduction of stricter environmental regulations can make up for shortcomings of the market failure. Specifically, the penalty costs and innovation subsidies that the government offers to industry groups and university groups have a positive correlation with the stabilization of the green innovation ecosystem. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:解决现有绿色技术联盟的高等研发风险和负关联性,中国政府专注于绿色创新生态系统,促进政府 - 大学 - 工业联盟的绿色协同创新活动。然而,由于高成本,低利润和清洁技术投资的长期回报,绿色创新生态系统经常遭受不足的稳定性。现有文学分析了环境规范对清洁技术创新的影响及创新生态系统对多智能经纪人协作创新的作用和作用的影响。但是,影响绿色创新生态系统稳定的关键因素是什么,以及环境监管政策对该生态系统的多贸易协作创新的影响是什么?为了填补这些差距,与以往的绿色创新文献中的研究不同,本研究采用基于比赛的理论,揭示了绿色创新过程中的游戏策略变化,并研究了大学行业生态创新联盟环境监管的进化游戏机制。在此基础上,案例仿真方法用于改变参数值以模拟影响绿色创新生态系统在多代理协作创新中的关键因素。研究表明,进化博弈分析将有两项最终策略:第一,行业团体和大学团体将采用合作创新战略;第二。产业团体和大学团体将采用背叛联盟战略。在市场机制中,较高的默认成本和研究和开发成本的分配比和绿色创新效益是影响绿色创新生态系统稳定的关键因素。然而,引入更严格的环境法规可以弥补市场失败的缺点。具体而言,政府向工业集团和大学团体的罚款成本和创新补贴与稳定绿色创新生态系统的稳定性相关。 (c)2020 elestvier有限公司保留所有权利。

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