Marketing in Heterozygous Advantage

摘要

As the rapidly advancing possibilities of biotechnology have outstripped the adaptive capacity of current legal and ethical institutions, a vigorous debate has arisen that considers the boundaries of appropriate use of this technology, particularly when applied to humans. This article examines ethical concerns surrounding the development of markets in a particular form of human genetic engineering in which heterozygotes are fitter than both homozygotes, a condition known as heterozygous advantage. To begin, we present a generalized model of the condition, illuminated by the application to sickle-cell anemia. Next, we propose a typology of related markets, some of which are currently functioning with available products and services, and others that are widely viewed as imminent. We suggest the manner in which perverse incentives may arise for firms that market genetic intervention in circumstances where heterozygous advantage is possible. Finally, we propose that this misalignment of incentives with social welfare has arisen from both ill-conceived market intervention where markets are capable of achieving efficient outcomes and the lack of market intervention where markets have failed. We offer specific legal and regulatory approaches for reform.